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Abstract 
What aspects of ingroup identification can lead people to resist justice for the victims of 
their ingroup’s mistreatment?  In three studies carried out in the US and UK, in which 
participants read reports of mistreatment of prisoners and civilians by coalition troops in 
the Iraq war, ingroup glorification, but not ingroup attachment or other individual- 
difference variables, was a key predictor of lesser demands for justice, but only when the 
perpetrators belonged to the ingroup. This effect of glorification was mediated by two 
moral disengagement mechanisms focusing on the outgroup: minimization of the 
emotional suffering of the victims’ families, and explicit dehumanization of the victim 
group. These findings further reinforce the difference between glorification and other 
forms of ingroup identification, demonstrating that glorification is problematic in 
maintaining and fostering intergroup relations, because of its connection to moral 
disengagement. 
 
Keywords: moral disengagement, ingroup identification, justice, collective violence, 
intergroup relations 
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  Ingroup Glorification, Moral Disengagement, and Justice in the Context of 
Collective Violence 
Since the Nuremberg trials following the Second World War, we have witnessed 
an evolution in the ways in which people and institutions are held accountable for crimes 
against humanity. Developments in international law, as well as the increased availability 
of images and information, have led the international community to demand greater 
responsibility for acts of cruelty committed on a national level (Castano, 2008). 
Following the Nuremberg precedent, numerous state leaders have been brought to trial – 
whether the crimes were committed recently, as in the trial of Slobodan Milosevic for 
crimes during conflicts in the Balkans in the 1990s, or decades earlier, as in the trial of 
Augusto Pinochet for crimes during his dictatorship in the 1970s. Legal proceedings have 
also targeted individuals lower in the hierarchy of the perpetrating system, such as 
members of Nazi Einsatzgruppen death squads, or members of the Scorpions, a Serb 
paramilitary unit responsible for massacres in the Bosnian and Kosovo wars. While 
justice is sometimes administered by groups that do not share a national identity with the 
perpetrators (e.g., the Einsatzgruppen trials conducted by U.S. military courts), it is 
increasingly often within the national group that it is pursued (e.g., the 2004-2005 courts-
martial of U.S. soldiers who mistreated prisoners at Abu Ghraib in Iraq). 
Oftentimes, a critical factor in deciding whether perpetrators will be brought to 
justice by bodies within their national group is the strength of demands for justice among 
their ingroup. When pressured by the international community to pursue justice, political 
leaders may feel constrained by internal public sympathy for the perpetrators because 
they are fellow nationals. These constraints can reduce willingness to pursue both 
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retributive justice (i.e., punishment of perpetrators) as well as restorative justice (i.e., 
apologies or reparations to victims of the wrongdoings, their family members, 
institutions, or foreign governments). For example, in 2002 the United States formally 
withdrew from the Rome Treaty establishing the International Criminal Court, partly out 
of concern that it could be used to prosecute U.S. leaders and troops. Therefore, 
understanding the psychological precursors and barriers to public demands for justice is 
important in the aftermath of domestic and international conflicts. In this research, we 
investigate the role played by social identification and moral disengagement strategies in 
reducing demands for intergroup justice. 
 
Social Identifications: Attachment versus Glorification 
Past research has treated social identification as a unidimensional construct, 
typically measured with a single scale (e.g., Bliuc, McGarty, Reynolds, & Muntele, 2007; 
Doosje, Ellemers, & Spears, 1995). More recent research has found this unidimensional 
approach to be conceptually and empirically insufficient (for reviews, see Ashmore, 
Deaux, & McLaughlin-Volpe, 2004; Leach, van Zomeren, Zebel, Vliek, Pennekamp, 
Doosje, Ouwerkerk, & Spears, 2008; Lickel, Schmader, & Spanovic, 2007; Sellers, 
Smith, Shelton, Rowley, & Chavous, 1998; Roccas, Sagiv, Schwartz, Halevy, & 
Eidelson, 2008). The more recent multidimensional approach parallels long-standing 
distinctions that scholars studying national identification have drawn between pseudo-
patriotism and genuine patriotism (Adorno, Frenkel, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950), 
nationalism and patriotism (Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989), and between blind, 
constructive, and conventional patriotism (Staub, 1997). 
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Roccas, Klar, and Liviatan (2006), in their studies of reactions to ingroup 
wrongdoings, proposed a bi-dimensional view of identification with one’s nation, 
distinguishing between attachment and glorification. Attachment refers to subjective 
identification of one’s self with the essence and common fate of a group, whereas 
glorification refers to the belief that one’s group is superior to outgroups on a variety of 
dimensions. This includes beliefs in superior ingroup morality, a dimension shown to be 
the most important in determining ingroup attitudes (Leach, Ellemers, & Barreto, 2007). 
The main difference between glorification and attachment is that glorification has a 
comparative component, focusing on the superiority of the ingroup over other groups, 
and emphasizes loyalty and obedience to the ingroup, whereas attachment is lacking such 
a comparative component, being entirely ingroup-focused and allowing for a more 
critical evaluation of the ingroup and its actions (cf. Brewer, 2001). 
Beliefs in the superiority and impeccability of the ingroup could easily lead 
people to see less injustice in ingroup wrongdoings (e.g., oppression, violence). Also, as 
glorification is concerned with preserving the image of the (allegedly superior) ingroup, 
threats to such an inflated image are likely to result in the deployment of defensive 
strategies. Therefore, high glorifiers likely see less need for re-establishing justice, and 
respond to their own group’s atrocities by subjectively diminishing the impact of the 
ingroup’s actions and by derogating the victims. 
Roccas et al. (2006) have already shown that ingroup attachment and glorification 
have opposing relations to important social psychological variables. In an Israeli sample 
confronted with violent actions committed by Israelis against Palestinians, these authors 
found that glorification negatively predicted collective guilt and positively predicted 
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exonerating cognitions (e.g., thinking the accounts too harsh, blaming the Palestinians 
themselves). Attachment, on the other hand, had opposite effects. In line with these 
findings, we hypothesize that ingroup glorification, but not attachment, will be negatively 
related to demands for justice (i.e., punishment of perpetrators, compensation of victims) 
among members of the perpetrator group. Moreover, glorification should accompany 
defensive moral disengagement from the ingroup’s reprehensible behavior. 
 
Moral Disengagement 
Moral disengagement strategies are psychological processes that help people 
construe a version of reality in which their own actions are not reprehensible and 
therefore do not lead to self-sanctions (Bandura, 1990, 1999). Moral disengagement can 
take a number of forms. Our research focused on two types of disengagement that 
specifically involve perceptions of the outgroup: diminishing the victims’ psychological 
reality of pain and suffering (emotional minimization) and considering the victims as less 
than human (dehumanization), which, in turn, result in their exclusion from the scope of 
justice (Bar-Tal, 1990; Kelman, 1973; Opotow, 1990; Staub, 1987, 1990).  
The defense of ingroup identity through moral disengagement can also reduce 
cognitive dissonance (Brehm, 1956; Festinger; 1957) between prescriptive moral norms 
(i.e., personally held moral values) and descriptive moral norms reflected in the ingroup’s 
behavior (i.e., intragroup dissonance; Glasford, Dovidio, & Pratto, 2009). As a 
consequence, again, the demand for justice to be re-established might be reduced. 
Specifically, after moral disengagement, people might support less punishment of 
ingroup perpetrators and fewer reparations for outgroup victims. Consider this anecdote, 
Glorification, Moral Disengagement, and Collective Violence 7 
reported by Marcu, Lyons, and Hegarty (2007): “In 2003, a Hungarian judge decided that 
two [Gypsy] men wrongly accused of murder should receive less compensation than they 
had demanded in their wrongful-arrest suit” because, the judge argued, these men “had 
‘more primitive personalities than the average; therefore, the psychological damage they 
suffered was not so serious that it would justify the compensation they requested’” (p. 
875). This case stands as a stark example of how the dehumanization of victims and the 
minimization of their suffering (Bandura, 1999) may impede ingroup demands for justice 
in response to ingroup-committed wrongdoings.  
 
Glorification, Moral Disengagement, and Justice 
We have outlined above our rationale for expecting glorification, but not 
attachment, to be negatively related to demands for justice against fellow ingroup 
perpetrators (i.e., punishment) and for outgroup victims (i.e., compensation). We further 
expect this effect to be mediated by increased moral disengagement among high 
glorifiers. Acknowledging that ingroup-committed atrocities are unjust threatens the 
glorifier’s belief that the ingroup is superior, particularly in terms of morality, to other 
groups. This threat to the identity of ingroup glorifiers is dealt with by the psychological 
defenses of moral disengagement, which in turn result in lower demands for justice.  
Because social identification is the cornerstone of this process of appraising 
justice, we expect ingroup glorification to reduce justice demands via moral 
disengagement only when moral aspects of one’s own group superiority are threatened, as 
is the case when one’s ingroup committed an atrocity against another group. We do not 
expect this process to occur when injustice is perpetrated by another group rather than 
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one’s own group. As Leyens, Paladino, Rodriguez-Torres, Vaes, Demoulin, Rodriguez-
Perez, and Gaunt (2000) have shown, a subtle form of dehumanization, called 
infrahumanization, is a fairly ubiquitous component of the perception of outgroups. 
However, infrahumanization can also become enhanced and take on the function of moral 
disengagement in specific situations, such as when the ingroup intends future violence 
against an outgroup (e.g., the dehumanization of Jews by Nazi propaganda prior to the 
Holocaust) or seeks to justify its past violence against them (Castano & Giner-Sorolla, 
2006). Therefore, we expect mechanisms such as emotional minimization and 
dehumanization to be present in the context of both ingroup- and outgroup-committed 
atrocities. Only in the case of ingroup-committed atrocities, however, should these 
mechanisms take on a moral disengagement function, because only then is the moral 
character of the ingroup at stake. In other words, it is not merely threats to psychological 
equanimity due to human suffering in general, or empathic feelings for the victims, that 
can account for our proposed effects of moral threat on justice seeking. 
Whereas ingroup glorification is expected to moderate moral disengagement and 
ultimately justice because of identity concerns, ingroup attachment should not have the 
same effects. Because ingroup attachment does not assume ingroup superiority and 
allows for constructive criticism of the ingroup, highly attached people are not as 
threatened by ingroup misdeeds as high glorifiers. Therefore, even though attachment 
might show a zero-order positive relation to psychological defenses in response to 
ingroup-committed atrocities, when controlling for glorification this relationship should 
disappear or even become negative. Likewise, attachment should not accompany reduced 
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demands for justice, when controlling for glorification; if anything, attachment should 
affect demands for justice positively. 
In the following studies we tested the effect of ingroup glorification on justice 
demands, as well as the mediating role of two outgroup-focused moral disengagement 
strategies: dehumanization and emotional minimization. 
 
Study 1 
Study 1 tested our hypotheses by manipulating whether an atrocity was attributed 
to ingroup versus outgroup agents. We measured the individual difference variables 
attachment and glorification; the mediating variables dehumanization and emotional 
minimization; and the outcome variable demands for justice for the victims and 
perpetrators. In order to maximize the psychological realism and relevance of the study, 
the context for our U.S. participants was the recent Iraq war, with descriptions of human 
rights violations committed either by U.S. (ingroup) or Iraqi (outgroup) soldiers. This 
manipulation aimed to show that the hypothesized process of dealing with ingroup 
wrongdoing does not emerge when wrongdoings are committed by an outgroup against 
another group. Mechanisms such as dehumanization and emotional minimization may 
also occur in response to outgroup wrongdoings. However, in that context they should not 
serve the function of reducing the demand for justice, but rather may be explained as a 
consequence of the mere threat human suffering poses to psychological equanimity.  
Method 
Participants. The sample consisted of 308 participants born in the U.S. who were 
recruited through the Internet website Craigslist.com. Although online samples are less 
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controlled than offline samples, recent research did not find significant differences when 
comparing online and offline samples in the same studies or across different studies (e.g., 
Riva, Teruzzi, & Anolli, 2003); furthermore, compared to offline samples, online samples 
tend to be more representative of the population in terms of demographics such as gender, 
socioeconomic status, and age, and they do not suffer from nonserious or repeated 
responders (Gosling, Vazire, Srivastava, & John, 2004). After excluding one participant 
who proved to be a univariate outlier on the emotional minimization measure and one 
participant on the justice measure, 306 participants were retained for data analysis (174 
female, 122 male, 10 who did not indicate gender; age M = 40.73, SD = 14.94, range = 
18-82). There were no multivariate outliers in any of the following analyses. 
Procedure. The experiment was conducted online. After giving consent, 
participants read a newspaper article depicting four alleged cases of coalition military 
personnel torturing and killing Iraqi civilians in a prison near Baghdad. Although names 
were changed, the cases were based on confirmed cases of abuse committed by U.S. 
military personnel in Iraq. The reported mistreatments of prisoners included water torture, 
beatings, stress positions, and humiliating acts. In all four cases, mistreatment and torture 
eventually led to the deaths of the prisoners. In the ingroup-perpetrator condition, the 
perpetrators were described as U.S. soldiers, whereas in the outgroup-perpetrator 
condition, the perpetrators were described as Iraqi soldiers; otherwise, the text remained 
identical across conditions. After reading the article, participants completed several 
dependent measures in the order described below. For all measures, participants answered 
on a visual analogue scale with different endpoints depending on the question, as detailed 
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below. No values appeared on the scale, but the program recorded answers on a 
continuum from 1 to X, with X equaling 5, 7, or 9, depending on the measure. 
Emotional minimization. Participants were presented with 13 negative emotion 
terms in alphabetical order: anguish, disgust, dismay, fear, fright, humiliation, 
melancholy, pain, panic, resentment, shame, sorrow, suffering. For each emotion 
participants answered “to what extent do you think that the dead prisoners’ family 
members felt this emotion when they were informed about the deaths” on a continuum 
ranging from not at all (1) to very much (5). This measure was intended to capture 
minimization of emotions. After reversing the items, high scores indicate a high degree of 
minimization of the emotional suffering of the victims’ family members. 
Explicit dehumanization. Explicit dehumanization was measured with ten items 
(e.g. “Compared to other populations, Iraqis are…” with responses ranging from less 
civilized to more civilized [reverse coded]; “It is very easy to endorse the values of 
Iraqis” [reverse coded]; “Some aspects of Iraqi life are typical of a backward culture”; 
“Compared to Westerners, moral values are less likely to be developed among Iraqis”). 
Participants indicated their response on a continuum from totally disagree (1) to totally 
agree (7). 
Justice was measured with seven items, three items tapping retributive aspects 
(“Independently from any other kind of punishment, these U.S./Iraqi soldiers should be 
fired by the army”; “Should the death penalty be considered for these U.S./Iraqi 
soldiers?”; with responses ranging from no, absolutely not to yes, absolutely; “For how 
long should these U.S./Iraqi soldiers be in jail?”; with responses ranging from minimum 
by law to maximum by law) and four items tapping restorative aspects (e.g., “The families 
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of the victims should receive financial compensation”; “The families of the victims 
should receive an apology by the U.S./Iraqi soldiers involved in the death of their family 
members”; “The families of the victims should receive an apology by the U.S./Iraqi 
government”; responses ranging from no, absolutely not to yes, absolutely). All responses 
were given on a continuum with endpoints of absolutely not (1) and yes, absolutely (7). 
National attachment and glorification. National attachment (e.g., “It is important 
to me to contribute to my nation”; “Being American is an important part of my identity”; 
“I am strongly committed to my nation”) and glorification (e.g., “Other nations can learn 
a lot from us”; “The U.S. is better than other nations in all respects”; “It is disloyal for 
Americans to criticize the U.S.”) were measured using the scales by Roccas et al. (2006), 
adapted to refer to the American identity. The responses were given on a continuum 
ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (7). 
Results 
We first checked for reliability of the glorification and attachment scales. Both 
attachment (Cronbach’s α = .94, M = 5.25, SD = 1.40) and glorification (Cronbach’s α = 
.88, M = 3.97, SD = 1.32) proved reliable. Furthermore, neither attachment, F(1, 301) < 
1.37, p > .10, η2 = .00, nor glorification, F(1, 298) < 0.12, p > .10, η2 = .00, were affected 
by the manipulation, thus allowing us to use them, together with the experimental 
manipulation (ingroup-perpetrator vs. outgroup-perpetrator), as independent variables 
(IVs) in a general linear model (GLM) procedure in SAS 9.2. Therefore, attachment and 
glorification were standardized (Aiken & West, 1991; Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 
2003). The GLM procedure outputs F values instead of t values, but it is equivalent to 
using a regression procedure with effect codings of the dichotomous variable(s). Below, 
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Fs are reported. The degrees of freedom vary slightly from analysis to analysis due to 
different numbers of missing values between dependent variables. 
Justice. The seven justice items showed good internal consistency and were thus 
averaged into a composite score (Cronbach’s α = .85, M = 5.25, SD = 1.32). On this 
score, using the GLM described above, significant main effects of condition, F(1, 294) = 
46.81, p < .001, η2 = .14, glorification, F(1, 294) = 12.71, p < .001, η2 = .04, and 
attachment, F(1, 294) = 4.25, p < .05, η2 = .01, emerged. Participants in the ingroup-
perpetrator condition (M = 4.76) showed a weaker demand for justice than participants in 
the outgroup-perpetrator condition (M = 5.70). Attachment was positively associated with 
justice, β = .14, t(294) = 2.06, p < .05, whereas glorification was negatively associated 
with justice, β = -.25, t(294) = -3.56, p < .001. Most importantly, as expected the 
interaction between condition and glorification was significant, F(1, 294) = 5.77, p < .05, 
η2 = .02. Demands for justice in the two conditions differed among low glorifiers (1 SD 
below the mean), t(294) = -2.14,  p < .05, as well as among high glorifiers (1 SD above 
the mean), t(294) = -6.26,  p < .001, with lower demands for justice in the ingroup-
perpetrator as compared to the outgroup-perpetrator condition, Ms = 5.32 and 5.81 for 
low glorifiers, and Ms = 4.20 and 5.60 for high glorifiers – but among high glorifiers this 
effect was much stronger than among low glorifiers. Looking at the same result from a 
different angle, glorification did not predict justice in the outgroup-perpetrator condition, 
β = -.08, t(294) = -0.89, p > .10, but it did so in the ingroup-perpetrator condition, β = -
.42, t(294) = -3.94, p < .001. The two-way interaction of condition and attachment, and 
the three-way interaction of condition, attachment, and glorification were not significant, 
Fs < 1, ps > .05. 
Glorification, Moral Disengagement, and Collective Violence 14 
Emotional minimization. A composite score of the thirteen (reversed) emotions 
participants attributed to the dead prisoners’ family members was computed. This score 
(Cronbach’s α = .91, M = 1.94, SD = 0.58) was then used as a dependent variable in the 
GLM described above, revealing significant main effects of glorification, F(1, 284) = 
7.83, p < .01, η2 = .03, and attachment, F(1, 284) = 5.37, p < .05, η2 = .02. Whereas 
glorification led to a greater degree of emotional minimization, β = .22, t(284) = 2.80, p < 
.01, attachment led to a lesser degree of emotional minimization β = -.18, t(284) = -2.32, 
p < .05. All other effects were not significant, Fs(1, 284) < 2.30, ps > .10. 
Explicit dehumanization. After excluding two items due to low item-total 
correlations, the remaining eight items tapping explicit dehumanization were averaged 
into a composite score (Cronbach’s α = .87, M = 4.28, SD = 1.21). The same analytical 
strategy as for emotional minimization revealed again a significant main effect of 
glorification – which was positively associated with explicit dehumanization of the victim 
group, F(1, 294) = 82.78, p < .001, η2 = .22, β = .58. All other effects were non-
significant, Fs(1, 294) < 1.50, ps > .10. 
As expected, there were no effects of condition on minimization or 
dehumanization, and attachment had, if anything, a diminishing rather than facilitating 
effect on these strategies controlling for glorification. Since attachment had no interactive 
effects on any of the above variables, we excluded the interactions involving attachment 
from the following mediational analyses that explain the link between glorification and 
justice we observed in the ingroup-perpetrator (but not in the outgroup-perpetrator) 
condition. 
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The mediational process. As reported above, glorification predicted justice in the 
ingroup-perpetrator condition, but not in the outgroup-perpetrator condition. Thus, 
mediation was assessed only in the ingroup-perpetrator condition. A multiple mediation 
model derived from our theory was thus tested via boot-strapping (Preacher & Hayes, 
2004, 2008), generating 95% bias-corrected and accelerated bootstrap confidence 
intervals for the indirect effects using 10,000 bootstrap samples. Attachment was also 
included as a covariate.  
In this model, the indirect effect of glorification on justice was significant (with a 
confidence interval not including zero) indicating multiple mediation between 
glorification and demands for justice.1 The model, with single path coefficients, is 
depicted in Figure 2, and the bivariate correlations are reported in Table 1. As expected, 
in the model, glorification positively predicted emotional minimization and explicit 
dehumanization. Both the minimization strategy and the dehumanization strategy affected 
justice negatively. While the total (zero-order) effect of glorification on justice was 
significant, once the mediators were included, the direct effect was not significant. 
Attachment, in line with our expectations, had no effect on justice (β = .04, t = 0.46, p > 
.05). Overall, this model explained 41% of the variance in justice and confirms our 
mediational hypothesis. 
Discussion 
Study 1 supported our hypotheses. In the ingroup-perpetrator condition, the 
multiple mediation analyses indicated that the negative effect of glorification on justice 
was mediated by moral disengagement strategies. This pattern supports our claim that 
emotional minimization and explicit dehumanization can function as moral 
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disengagement strategies when confronted with ingroup transgressions, affecting 
behavioral intentions such as demands for justice. In addition to providing support for the 
hypothesized process, results also confirmed that (controlling for glorification) 
attachment to the ingroup does not enhance moral disengagement strategies or lessen 
demands for justice. If anything, and consistent with what found by Roccas et al. (2006), 
attachment showed an opposite effect to that of glorification on one of the moral 
disengagement strategies, minimization. 
The shift from unidimensional measures of social identification to 
multidimensional measures such as glorification versus attachment is certainly a 
conceptual and empirical advancement. Given the relative recency of the glorification 
and attachment constructs and scales, it would be of interest to assess whether their 
contribution to the processes described above is unique, or whether it is due to shared 
variance with other, related constructs – a question not yet tested in published research.  
One personality construct that has common but also distinct features with 
glorification is social dominance orientation (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 
1994). Social dominance orientation (SDO) refers to a person’s tendency to be in favor of 
group-based hierarchies and domination of some groups, considered superior, over other 
groups, considered inferior (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Therefore, SDO is related to the 
degree with which people categorize groups on domains of status and power, and with 
which they favor social inequality. Without distinguishing different aspects of 
identification, SDO has been found to correlate positively with national identification 
(Pratto, Stallworth, & Conway-Lanz, 1998). We share the assumption made by Roccas et 
al. (2008) that this relationship stems mainly from the superiority aspect of glorification. 
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SDO, however, is about intergroup hierarchies in general and only indirectly entails the 
conviction that one’s ingroup is superior in both power and morality to other groups, 
whereas glorification builds on this superiority assumption, specifically comparing the 
ingroup versus outgroups as one of its cornerstones. Moreover, glorification includes the 
facet of loyalty and obedience to the ingroup as its second main component, whereas 
SDO does not. 
Findings in two surveys of American students reported by Roccas et al. (2008) 
support our reasoning. In these surveys, SDO correlated most strongly with “superiority 
identification” (a construct similar to the superiority aspect of glorification) rather than, 
for instance, “deference identification”. These and similar findings (Roccas et al., 2008) 
suggest that SDO may overlap with part of the glorification scale, but is unlikely to 
replace glorification as a whole. We would thus predict that, in addition to their shared 
variance, SDO and glorification will also have some unique variance because of the 
differences in their conception and operationalization. The question is thus whether the 
moderating role of glorification on justice that emerged in Study 1 holds when controlling 
for SDO.  
 
Study 2 
This study was conducted to replicate the findings of Study 1 and to further assess 
the specific role of glorification. Furthermore, Study 2 makes two methodological 
improvements on Study 1. First, attachment and glorification were measured at the end of 
Study 1, because we did not want to suggest to participants that the study had anything to 
do with national identification before they read the article and completed the other 
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measures. Despite attachment and glorification being measured at the end of the study, 
using them as moderators of the effect of the manipulation was justified because the 
manipulation had no effect on either. Nonetheless, given our mediational model, it would 
be more desirable to measure them first, before the manipulation and other variables. 
Second, in the outgroup-perpetrator condition of Study 1, the social identity of the 
perpetrators (Iraqis) overlapped with that of the victims, who were both likely to be 
thought of as Iraqis, Middle-Easterners, or Arabs. Therefore, in Study 2, we chose an 
English-speaking “ally” group, Australians, as the outgroup perpetrators, making an even 
stronger test of our hypotheses about differential ingroup vs. outgroup effects. 
Method 
Participants. The sample consisted of 177 participants, recruited through the 
Study Response Project (Stanton, 2006; Wallace, 2004). After eliminating 18 people who 
were not born in the U.S., ten people who did not correctly remember the identity of the 
perpetrating group, and one univariate outlier on the justice measure, 148 participants 
(103 female, 43 male, 2 did not indicate their gender; age M = 33.27, SD = 12.34, range = 
18-65) were retained for subsequent analyses. 
Materials and Procedure. The experiment was conducted online. After giving 
consent and filling out the measures for Attachment (α = .91; M = 5.94; SD = 1.71), 
glorification (α = .86; M = 4.10; SD = 1.62), and Social Dominance Orientation, assessed 
via the SDO6 scale (Pratto et al., 1994; Sidanius, Levin, Liu, & Pratto, 2000; α = .90; M = 
2.70; SD = 1.25), participants read a newspaper article identical to that used in Study 1, 
apart from the outgroup perpetrators being Australian. Then participants answered the 
same emotional minimization (Cronbach’s α = .88, M = 2.56, SD = 1.05) and explicit 
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dehumanization (Cronbach’s α = .82; M = 4.50, SD = 1.43) scales as in Study 1. In the 
justice scale (Cronbach’s α = .77; M = 7.03, SD = 1.45), one of the seven items (tapping 
capital punishment) was eliminated due to an item-total correlation < .40. All items were 
answered on a visual analog scale with endpoints of 1 and 9. 
Results 
The same analytical approach used in Study 1 was adopted here, with the 
addition, in the GLM analyses, of SDO and the interaction between condition and SDO. 
Justice was significantly affected by the manipulation, F(1, 139) = 15.52, p < 
.01, η2 = .10, with participants in the ingroup-perpetrator condition demanding 
significantly less justice (M = 6.63) than participants in the outgroup-perpetrator 
condition (M = 7.51). As in Study 1, this effect was qualified by the expected significant 
interaction between manipulation and glorification, F(1, 139) = 4.46, p < .05, η2 = .03, 
which mirrors that found in Study 1, even having controlled for SDO and its interaction 
with condition. Whereas low glorifiers did not significantly differ in their demands for 
justice depending on condition, t = -0.53, p > .10 (Ms = 7.22 and 7.41 in the ingroup- and 
outgroup-perpetrator condition, respectively), high glorifiers demanded significantly less 
justice when the perpetrators belonged to their ingroup (M = 6.15) than when they 
belonged to another group (M = 7.58), t = -3.97, p < .01. Looking at this interaction from 
another angle, glorification did not predict justice in the outgroup-perpetrator condition, t 
= 0.39, p > .10, but it did so in the ingroup-perpetrator condition, t(139) = -2.68, β = -.53, 
p < .01. The main effect of SDO was also significant, indicating that demands for justice 
decreased with increasing SDO, F(1, 139) = 19.70, p < .001, η2 = .12, β = -.49. The main 
effect of glorification was in the same direction as in Study 1, with justice demands 
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decreasing with increasing glorification, but only trending towards significance, F(1, 139) 
= 3.20, p = .12, η2 = .01, β = -.23. All other effects were non-significant, Fs(1, 139) < 
2.00, ps > .15. 
Emotional minimization. SDO was also a significant covariate predicting 
emotional minimization, F(1, 128) = 14.14, p < .001, η2 = .10. Greater SDO led to greater 
minimization of the emotions of the victims’ family members, β = .34. The main effect of 
glorification, again controlling for SDO and its interaction with condition, was in the 
same direction as in Study 1, but did not reach significance, F(1, 128) = 1.06, p > .10, η2 
= .01, β = .13. All other effects were not significant, Fs(1, 128) < 1.20, ps > .10. As in 
Study 1, the non-significant main effect of condition indicates that people minimized the 
emotions of the victims’ family members to the same extent in both conditions, even if it 
should only serve as a moral disengagement strategy in the ingroup-perpetrator condition.  
Explicit dehumanization. The main effect of glorification emerged, F(1, 140) = 
10.09, p < .01, η2 = .07, showing that explicit dehumanization increased with increasing 
levels of glorification, β = .46. No interaction between glorification and condition 
emerged, F(1, 140) = 0.37, p > .10, and the main effect of condition was not significant, 
F(1, 140) = 1.52, p > .10, which was in line with the hypothesis that some 
dehumanization arises even when the perpetrator is an outgroup. The main effect of SDO 
was significant, F(1, 140) = 8.76, p < .01, η2 = .06, with greater SDO predicting greater 
explicit dehumanization, β = .32. However, it should be noted that glorification still 
accounted for dehumanization, even taking into account this effect of SDO. As in the 
preceding analyses of justice and minimization, attachment did not have any significant 
main or interaction effect, Fs(1, 140) < 2.00, ps > .10. 
Glorification, Moral Disengagement, and Collective Violence 21 
The mediational process. As in Study 1, while no effect of glorification on justice 
appeared in the outgroup condition, this effect was significant in the ingroup condition 
(see Table 2 for bivariate correlations). We thus tested a multiple mediation model to 
assess whether moral disengagement strategies mediated this effect.2 As in study 1, this 
model revealed a significant indirect effect. Looking at the components of these paths, 
glorification affected dehumanization significantly, but despite a positive relationship of 
moderate degree, its effect on minimization did not reach significance, possibly due to the 
relatively smaller sample (N = 74) compared to Study 1. Minimization predicted justice 
significantly negatively, whereas dehumanization’s negative effect on justice did not 
reach significance, again despite a substantial strength of relationship and therefore 
possibly owed to the small sample size. The total (zero-order) effect of glorification on 
justice was significant, whereas the direct effect, including the mediators in the model, 
was not. The effect of attachment on justice was not significant (β = -.09, t = -0.40, p > 
.05). This model explained 46% of the variance in justice. 
The significance of the indirect effect and the non-significance of the direct effect 
are consistent with the mediation hypothesis, and in line with what we observed in Study 
1. Two of the paths did not reach significance, but their strength was similar to what 
observed in Study 1 and sample size might thus be responsible for this partial 
discrepancy. We therefore tested the multiple mediation model with the samples of Study 
1 and Study 2 combined. With this larger sample all predicted relations between variables 
were significant and in the expected directions, and the indirect effect of glorification on 
justice was significant. Also as expected, the direct effect of glorification on justice and 
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the effect of attachment on justice (β = .01, t = 0.20, p > .10) were not significant. This 
model explained 46% of the variance in justice – see Figure 5). 
Discussion 
 Study 2 yielded further evidence for the main hypothesis of interest – that is, the 
moderating role of ingroup glorification, but not attachment, on demands for justice in the 
context of ingroup wrongdoings. Furthermore, it also replicated the mediating role of 
moral disengagement strategies on this relationship. Therefore, Study 2 replicated the 
findings from Study 1, while at the same time addressing its shortcomings. First, 
attachment and glorification were measured before the manipulation. Second, the 
moderating role of glorification on the effect of condition (ingroup versus outgroup 
perpetrator) on justice demands remained after controlling for SDO. Third, the social 
identities of perpetrators and victims in the outgroup-perpetrator condition were not 
overlapping, and the results were found even when the outgroup was more similar to the 
ingroup in terms of its place in the international community, and an ally of the ingroup in 
the conflict at hand. 
 
Study 3 
This study sought to replicate the most important findings from the ingroup 
conditions of Study 1 and Study 2, while using a different participant population involved 
in the issue of Iraq War atrocities. Specifically, British participants were recruited and 
presented with reports of army atrocities similar to the U.S.-based reports in the previous 
studies. To focus on the mediational process in a larger sample, only the ingroup-
perpetrator condition was included. 
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In Study 3, we also aimed at establishing the role of ingroup glorification further. 
Having tested SDO, which is similar to the superiority aspect of glorification, in Study 2, 
we now wanted to test that aspect of Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA; Altemeyer, 
1981, 1988, 1994, 1998) that is most similar to the loyalty and obedience aspect of 
glorification: authoritarian submission (AS). In fact, in the previously mentioned surveys 
of American students reported in Roccas et al. (2008), RWA as a whole correlated most 
strongly with “deference identification” (loyalty and obedience aspect of glorification) 
rather than other forms of identification such as “superiority identification”, suggesting 
that AS is a good representative of RWA in terms of loyalty and obedience. RWA has 
been repeatedly shown to correlate with prejudice, discrimination, and intolerance 
(Adorno et al., 1950; Altemeyer, 1988, 1994). Not surprisingly in light of the 
commonalities with glorification and its ‘siblings’ (e.g., nationalism), RWA was also 
found to correlate positively with nationalism but not with patriotism (Baughn & Yaprak, 
1996), a finding replicated across different measures of authoritarianism and 
identification (Blank, 2003; Burris, Branscombe, & Jackson, 2000; Duckitt, Wagner, du 
Plessis, & Birum, 2002). We believe, however, that glorification goes beyond RWA, for 
RWA does not include the perceived superiority of one’s ingroup over other groups, a 
key feature of glorification. In line with this theoretical notion, Roccas et al. (2008) report 
a study that showed that deference explained people’s intolerance toward conscientious 
objectors to military service in Israel, and it did so beyond the explanation of RWA. 
These findings suggest that RWA, despite its likely overlap with a part of glorification, is 
unlikely to replace glorification. 
Method 
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Participants. 121 British citizens completed the survey (32 male, 89 female, age 
M = 21.11, SD = 7.49, age range = 18-68). They were recruited through the research 
participation system at the University of Kent, and were offered partial course credit for 
completing the experiment.  
Materials and Procedure. The study was conducted online. After giving consent, 
participants were asked to confirm that they were British citizens. As in Study 2, 
attachment (Cronbach’s α = .91; M = 4.23, SD = 1.19) and glorification (Cronbach’s α  = 
.86, M = 3.42, SD = 0.99) were then measured before the manipulation, and so was 
authoritarian submission (AS) (Cronbach’s α = .81, M = 3.59, SD = 0.75; Duckitt, 
Bizumic, & Krauss’, 2009). 
Participants then took part in a self-reflection task and a cognitive estimation filler 
task that were theoretically unrelated to the questions being studied. These tasks acted to 
separate the identification questions from the main study, making the connection less 
obvious. Next, participants were then asked to read a newspaper article describing British 
military personnel torturing and killing Iraqi civilians near Basra, which was based on 
actual incidents involving the British military, similar to the article used in Study 1 and 
Study 2 based on U.S. incidents. After participants read the article, the mediators and 
outcome variables were measured, using the same scales as in Study 2, altered to fit the 
British context: emotional minimization (Cronbach’s α = .87, M = 1.76, SD = 0.62); 
explicit dehumanization (Cronbach’s α = .81; M = 3.67, SD = 0.85); and justice 
(Cronbach’s α = .80; M = 5.29, SD = 1.18), from which one of the seven items was 
eliminated due to an item-total correlation less than .40. All items were assessed on scales 
ranging from 1 to 7. 
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Results 
Justice items. The justice score was entered as the dependent variable in a general 
linear model with (standardized) attachment glorification and AS. The main effect of 
glorification was marginally significant, F(1, 117) = 3.48, p = .064, η2 = .03, and it 
affected justice negatively, β = -.27. Attachment and AS were not significant, Fs(1, 116) 
< 1.6 (ps > .20). 
Emotional minimization. One multivariate outlier was found and removed from 
subsequent analysis. The same analytic model was used but with emotional minimization 
as the dependent variable. Glorification had a significant effect, F(1, 116) = 4.45, p = 
.037, η2 = .04, and positively predicted emotional minimization, β = .31. AS also 
positively predicted minimization, β = .21, F(1, 116) = 4.42, p = .038, η2 = .04. 
Attachment was also significant, F(1, 116) = 8.12, p < .01, η2 = .07, affecting emotional 
minimization negatively, β = -.37.  
Explicit dehumanization. Here too, one multivariate outlier was found and 
removed from subsequent analysis. The only significant main effect was glorification, 
F(1, 116) = 5.84, p = .017, η2 = .05, which positively predicted explicit dehumanization, 
β = .37. All other effects were non-significant, Fs(1, 116) < .70, ps > .10.  
The mediational process.  As in Study 1 and 2, a multiple mediation model (see 
Figure 6) tested the role of our two moral disengagement strategies (emotional 
minimization and explicit dehumanization) as mediators of the relationship between 
glorification and justice via bootstrapping. Again, attachment was included as a covariate.  
As in Study 1, the indirect effect of glorification on justice was significant 
(confidence interval not including zero).3 The model, with single path coefficients, is 
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depicted in Figure 6, and the bivariate correlations are reported in Table 3. Again, as in 
Study 1 and as predicted, glorification positively predicted emotional minimization and 
explicit dehumanization. Minimization and dehumanization negatively affected justice. 
The total (zero-order) effect of glorification on justice was significant, but once the 
mediators were included in the model, the direct effect was no longer significant. 
Attachment, in line with our expectations, had no effect on justice (β = .01, t = .041., p > 
.95). Overall, this model explained 26% of the variance in justice and confirms our 
mediational hypothesis.  
 
General Discussion 
Over the past two decades there has been an increased willingness in the 
international community to attempt to pursue justice in cases of violations of human 
rights conventions and other atrocities committed in the context of conflict. In this paper 
we investigated the psychological processes that underlie the perception of the events, 
and particularly of the victims, by individuals who share a social identity with the 
perpetrators, and how these processes affect the pursuit of both retributive and restorative 
justice. Specifically, we expected that individuals would respond differently to atrocities 
committed by the ingroup as compared to an outgroup, and that the extent to which they 
glorify the ingroup in the first place would moderate such an effect. Furthermore, we 
proposed that justice demanded in the case of atrocities committed by the ingroup would 
be mediated by moral disengagement strategies. 
Three studies, two conducted in the U.S. and one in the U.K., provided support to 
our hypotheses, showing that high glorification predicts a lesser desire to re-establish 
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justice and that the moral disengagement strategies of  dehumanization and minimization 
of the emotional suffering of the victims mediated this effect. Below we comment in 
more details on these findings and their implications, and outline ways in which the 
present research can be improved and expanded upon. 
 
Glorification versus Attachment 
Building on literature on the various forms of identification with the ingroup, and 
particularly the work by Roccas et al. (2006), we hypothesized and found that 
glorification should lead to greater use of moral disengagement strategies and, in turn, to 
a lesser desire to re-establish justice, when individuals are confronted with an ingroup-
committed atrocity. Importantly, as opposed to glorification, attachment did not lead to 
any of these effects.  If anything, attachment seemed to predict these variables in the 
opposite direction – a trend consistent with findings by Roccas et al. (2006). 
The role of glorification in blocking support for the pursuit of justice has 
important consequences for social psychological theory and application. Social identity 
theorists have long discussed the relation between strength of identification with the 
ingroup and negative biases, such as outgroup derogation. Brewer (2001), for instance, 
argues that ingroup love (attachment) does not necessarily translate into outgroup hate. In 
the context of the present studies, it seems that attachment does not necessarily translate 
into reduced calls for justice for ingroup misdeeds. 
This separation of glorification and attachment is in some ways reassuring, 
because attachment to the ingroup appears to be a fundamental psychological need of the 
individual (Castano, 2004; Castano & Dechesne, 2005; Hogg, Sherman, Dierselhuis, 
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Moffitt, & Maitner, 2007; Reid & Hogg, 2005), and thus not something that we can hope 
to easily dispense with, or even significantly diminish. Fortunately, our findings do not 
indicate a need to reduce attachment. Although we know little about the genesis of 
glorifying tendencies, such tendencies may not be a necessary psychological construct, 
but rather an aspect of identification that is fuelled by political rhetoric (Castano, 2008). 
If this is indeed the case, it is possible that the tendency to glorify the ingroup might be 
tamed without denying the individual a group identity altogether. 
Another aspect of our glorification-related findings deserves comment. The 
above-described effect of glorification emerged even after controlling for Social 
Dominance Orientation (Study 2) and a relevant aspect of Right-Wing Authoritarianism 
(Study 3). Although the glorification scale bears resemblance with aspects of both SDO 
and RWA, it also has clear, idiosyncratic dimensions that set it aside from both of these 
concepts. Glorification focuses on perceived power and morality of the ingroup, in a 
comparative manner, and emphasizes loyalty and obedience to the ingroup. It would 
seem that glorification plays a role similar to nationalism (as opposed to patriotism; 
Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989), which has been shown to moderate the positive 
relationship between need for closure and support for military action against Iraq 
(Federico, Golec, & Dial, 2005). The advantage of the glorification scale, however, is its 
generalizability. Unlike nationalism, which is confined to national groups, glorification is 
applicable to any social group: for example, religious groups, cultural groups, or political 
parties. 
 
The Role of Moral Disengagement Strategies 
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A central goal of the present contribution was to assess the mediating role of 
moral disengagement strategies in the relationship between glorification and justice. 
Based on social psychological literature, we predicted and found that, while individuals 
engage in moral disengagement strategies to a similar extent when confronted with 
outgroup versus ingroup committed atrocities, only in the ingroup-perpetrator condition 
these strategies mediated the effect of glorification on justice. This result is, in our view, 
noteworthy. It has long been argued that moral disengagement strategies are “for doing” 
(Bar-Tal, 1990; Kelman, 1973; Opotow, 1990; Staub, 1987; 1990), but no clear empirical 
evidence of such a link has been provided to date. The present data thus demonstrate that 
moral disengagement strategies do not just reflect inconsequential beliefs about the 
outgroup. Rather, they are psychological mechanisms that are strategically used to 
morally disengage from past ingroup violence, and their use has detrimental 
consequences for behavioral intentions such as justice demands, in terms of punishment 
for ingroup perpetrators and compensation of the outgroup victims. 
Moreover, moral disengagement likely helps to maintain system justification 
beliefs (Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004) which are threatened by the 
unjust behavior of the ingroup. Our focus in this paper was on glorification, and thus we 
tested more closely other individual differences variables such as SDO and RWA, as 
opposed to system-justifying tendencies. There is recent evidence, however, that 
endorsements of system-justifying ideology negatively affect emotional distress and 
intentions to help the disadvantaged (Wakslak, Jost, Tyler, & Chen, 2007). Future 
research in which the moderating role of responsibility for the distress and disadvantage 
of others would provide a bridge between these and our own findings. 
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In the studies presented here we considered two moral disengagement 
strategies: dehumanization and minimization of the emotional suffering of the victims. 
Dehumanization is a well-documented phenomenon (Castano & Kofta, 2009; Haslam, 
2006) that previous research has already investigated in the context of moral 
disengagement (Castano & Giner-Sorolla, 2006; Cehajic, Brown, & Gonzalez, 2008b). 
The minimization of the emotional suffering of victims has not been thoroughly 
investigated, but it is clearly connected with different lines of social psychological 
research.  
A number of studies have already established that empathy for outgroup suffering 
is lower than for ingroup suffering, and that dehumanization plays a part in this effect 
(DeLuca & Castano, 2009; Cuddy, Rock, & Norton, 2007; Cehajic, Brown, & Castano, 
2008a). In our view, however, the minimization mechanism is an even more radical step 
than non-empathic reactions. Instead of not feeling a victim’s pain, minimizing reflects a 
denial of emotional sensitivity to the victim. This minimization may be morally 
disengaging in two different ways. It implicitly suggests that the actions were not as 
horrible as they may appear, and/or they imply that the victims do not have the capacity 
for suffering at a deep level, possibly because they are incapable of emotionality. The 
latter may be akin to a mechanistic dehumanization (Haslam, 2006). In its former 
meaning, minimization is ultimately an ingroup-centered moral disengagement strategy, 
while in the latter meaning it is outgroup-centered; it helps in removing victims from the 
sphere of humanity, and thus from the scope of justice. 
While moral disengagement strategies can have negative consequences for 
intergroup relations and justice, they may also lead to positive outcomes for the 
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individual utilizing them, notably by protecting the psychological equanimity and the 
identity of the individual in the presence of threatening information (Bandura, 1999). 
Moral disengagement in this way might resemble the analysis of certain collective rituals 
(e.g., mourning rituals, funeral rites) as proposed by Durkheim (1912). In Durkheim’s 
model, the rituals enhance negative emotions at the individual level, but lead to an 
increase in the cohesion of the group, and thus they are valued from a societal standpoint. 
In the case of moral disengagement as investigated here, the opposite may be happening: 
the individual uses such strategies to avoid negative emotionality, but the strategies have 
negative consequences at the societal level, because they are detrimental to intergroup 
relations. It should be noted, however, that if the system of reference is restricted to the 
ingroup, then moral disengagement may actually have a positive impact at the collective 
level as well. Denigration of others may lead to ingroup-cohesion, and, for the group, 
shielding its members from punishment can appear to be beneficial for them, at least 
temporarily. For those who truly wish to treat all humans as having equal rights across 
national boundaries, however, moral disengagement is unequivocally something that 
stands in the way of justice.  
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Notes 
1 We also tested the model via separate single-mediator analyses via boot-
strapping for minimization and dehumanization; each of these analyses also showed a 
significant indirect effect. Furthermore, we tested the multiple mediation model via path 
analysis, which yielded a good fit (χ2(4, 141) = 5.57, p > .10; χ2/df = 1.39; RMSEA = 
.05; CFI = .99; NNFI = .98). An alternative model in which the moral disengagement 
strategies were the outcome variables and justice the mediator fit very poorly (χ2(5, 141) 
= 57.33, p < .001; χ2/df = 11.47; RMSEA = .27; CFI = .76; NNFI = .51), strengthening 
the validity of our model. 
2 We also tested the model via separate simple mediation analyses via boot-
strapping for each mediator separately, which also showed significant indirect paths 
involving each mediator. Furthermore, we tested the multiple mediation model via path 
analysis, which yielded a good fit (χ2(4, 74 = 5.11, p > .05; χ2/df = 1.28; RMSEA = .06; 
CFI = .99; NNFI = .98). An alternative model in which the moral disengagement 
strategies were the outcome variables and justice the mediator fit very poorly (χ2(5, 141) 
= 20.35, p = .001; χ2/df = 4.07; RMSEA = .21; CFI = .86; NNFI = .73), strengthening the 
validity of our model. 
3 As in Studies 1 and 2, single-mediator analyses for minimization and 
dehumanization via boot-strapping each showed a significant indirect effect. In path 
analysis, although the initial model from Study 2 showed poor global fit, χ2(5, 121) = 
14.16, p < .05; χ2/df = 2.69; RMSEA = .12; CFI = .94; NNFI = .83, inspection of a nearly 
fully saturated model omitting only the dehumanization-minimization path showed a 
significant negative path between attachment and emotional minimization (consistent 
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with the notion that attachment and glorification have different effects, high attachment 
predicted lower emotional minimization). The model including this path showed a close-
to perfect global fit (χ2(4, 121) = 4.05, p > .10; χ2/df = 1.01; RMSEA = .01; CFI = 1.00; 
NNFI = 1.00). As in Studies 1 & 2, an alternative model reversing the mediator status of 
justice and moral disengagement strategies had a very poor fit (χ2(5, 121) = 16.42, p < 
.01; χ2/df = 3.28; RMSEA = .14; CFI = .92; NNFI = .76).
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Tables 
Table 1: Correlations, Study 1. Correlations within the ingroup condition are reported 
above the diagonal, correlations within the outgroup condition are reported below the 
diagonal. (*** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05, + p < .10) 
Table 2: Correlations, Study 2. Correlations within the ingroup condition are reported 
above the diagonal, correlations within the outgroup condition are reported below the 
diagonal. (*** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05, + p < .10) 
Table 3: Correlations, Study 3 (*** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05, + p < .10).
Glorification, Moral Disengagement, and Collective Violence 46 
 













Glorification .67 *** 
154 






































Glorification, Moral Disengagement, and Collective Violence 47 
 

































































































































































Glorification, Moral Disengagement, and Collective Violence 49 
Figures 
Figure 1: Study 1. Effect of identity of perpetrator by glorification on justice. 
Figure 2: Study 1, ingroup condition (N = 141). Multiple mediation of the effect of 
glorification on justice via dehumanization and minimization, with attachment as 
covariate. All coefficients are standardized (*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05). 
Figure 3: Study 2. Effect of identity of perpetrator by glorification on justice. 
Figure 4: Study 2, ingroup condition (N = 74). Multiple mediation of the effect of 
glorification on justice via dehumanization and minimization, with attachment as 
covariate. All coefficients are standardized (*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05). 
Figure 5: Study 1 and 2 ingroup conditions combined (N = 215). Multiple mediation of 
the effect of glorification on justice via dehumanization and minimization, with 
attachment as covariate. All coefficients are standardized (*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < 
.05). 
Figure 6: Study 3 (N = 119). Multiple mediation of the effect of glorification on justice 
via dehumanization and minimization, with attachment as covariate. All coefficients are 
standardized (*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05). 
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